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Abstract
Objective: To describe an outbreak of multi-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa bloodstream infections (MRPA-BSI) that
occurred in the haematology ward of a tertiary academic hospital in Cape Town, South Africa, and determine risk factors for
acquisition of MRPA-BSI.
Methods: The outbreak investigation included a search for additional cases, review of patient records, environmental and
staff screening, molecular typing using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and Multi-locus sequencing (MLST) and a
retrospective case-control study.
Results: Ten MRPA-BSI cases occurred in the haematology ward between January 2010 and January 2011. The case fatality
rate was 80%. Staff screening specimens were negative for MRPA and an environmental source was not identified. PFGE
showed that 9/10 isolates were related. MLST showed that 3 of these 9 isolates belonged to Sequence type (ST) 233 while
the unrelated isolate belonged to ST260.
Conclusion: We have described an outbreak of MRPA-BSI occurring over an extended period of time among neutropenic
haematology patients. Molecular typing confirms that the outbreak was predominantly due to a single strain. The source of
the outbreak was not identified, but the outbreak appears to have been controlled following intensive infection control
measures.
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Introduction
The burden of nosocomial infection in low and middle income
countries has been under-appreciated in the past [1], with the
extent and impact of infections due to multi-resistant organisms
such as Pseudomonas aeruginosa, in particular being under-estimated
[2]. In the absence of well-resourced surveillance systems,
outbreak reports can serve to highlight serious pathogens. While
such outbreaks are frequently reported in the published literature,
relatively few of these reports originate from low income countries.
P. aeruginosa is a common cause of infection among hospitalized
patients. It is inherently resistant to certain antibiotics due to a
variety of resistance mechanisms. Treatment is further limited by
the ability of the organism to rapidly develop additional resistance
during treatment [3,4]. Risk factors for P. aeruginosa infection
include presence of indwelling devices, admission to an intensive
care unit, prior antibiotic use, length of hospitalization, severe
underlying disease and impaired immunity [5,6].
We investigated an outbreak of P. aeruginosa bloodstream
infection that occurred in the clinical haematology intensive care
unit of a tertiary academic hospital in Cape Town, South Africa.
Our report highlights the infection control, and general public




The haematology ward of the tertiary academic hospital is a
shared intensive care unit (ICU) with 12 isolation (private) rooms,
of which 6 are used by a public sector hospital and 6 by a private
hospital. Each room has an attached bathroom, as well as a
nursing anteroom. All have High-Efficiency Particulate Air
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(HEPA) filters and 5 have a laminar flow system installed to
provide protection against airborne pathogens. Access to the ward
is controlled and strict infection control procedures are followed.
Each hospital has its own nursing staff. However, various
facilities, including the nurses’ station and sluice room, as well as
staff facilities, such as tea room and change rooms, are shared by
the two hospitals. Food is provided to all patients from the kitchen
of the private hospital. Medical staff and cleaning staff attached to
the public hospital provide services to both groups of patients. In
addition to the regular ward staff, temporary nursing staff from
nursing agencies is sometimes employed. The ward admits patients
with malignant and non-malignant haematological conditions,
most of whom have undergone haemopoetic stem cell transplant
(HSCT) or are undergoing intensive chemotherapy. These
patients are usually highly immuno-compromised and are
extremely susceptible to infections. Patients are confined to
individual rooms, but do occasionally leave the ward, e.g. to visit
the radiology department for investigations.
Differences between the private and public sections of the unit
that might impact on the risk of infection include the better nurse:
patient ratio in the private sector, the more liberal patient selection
criteria in the private sector permitting the treatment of older
patients and the use of filgrastim, a granulocyte colony-stimulating
factor analogue, to shorten the period of neutropenia post- stem
cell transplant in selected high-risk patients in the private sector.
Data Collection
The laboratory database was searched to identify all P. aeruginosa
isolates from blood culture specimens from 1 January 2009 until
31 January 2011. Patients with P. aeruginosa isolates found in blood
specimens collected during their admission in the haematology
ward were identified. The hospital information system and patient
folders were reviewed in order to determine the hospitalization
history of the cases, demographic characteristics and clinical
history. Since the study was conducted as an outbreak investiga-
tion, informed consent of patients was not sought on the grounds
that a) clinical information was collected solely by retrospective
record review b) no additional specimens were collected from
patients for study purposes c) all patient identifying data was
removed prior to dissemination of results. The study was approved
by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Cape Town (Ref: 393/2011) and conducted according to the
ethical guidelines and principles of the International Declaration
of Helsinki and the Medical Research Council (MRC) guidelines
for Good Clinical Practice (GCP).
Staff and Environmental Screening
In November 2010 after a series of meetings and consultations
staff members were requested to submit stool specimens to
investigate gut colonization with P. aeruginosa and to report any
other possible personal sources of MRPA colonization such as
chronic otitis externa or any infection around finger nails.
Additional samples, such as contact plates from hands that might
detect more transient carriage, were not sought from staff because
of the delay in detection of the outbreak. Informed consent from
staff was not sought as screening of staff for possible carriage of the
organism of interest is good clinical practice and an essential part
of a public health intervention in this type of outbreak
investigation. No specific therapy would have been indicated for
staff found to be carrying resistant P. aeruginosa. However, they
would have been redeployed to other areas of the hospital
temporarily. The employers undertook that no staff member
would be financially or otherwise disadvantaged as a result of
testing. No penalties were applied to staff who did not submit
specimens.
Because of concerns around the safety of cleaning procedures
and because of P. aeruginosa’s propensity to survive in moist
environments, initial sampling in October 2010 focused on
cleaning equipment, water samples and swabs from taps in the
patient isolation rooms and from water used in respiratory therapy
equipment. Environmental surfaces were swabbed with sterile
swabs, pre-moistened in sterile water. Swabs were placed in
commercial transport medium and transported rapidly to an on-
site laboratory. For collection of water samples, 100 ml of water
was collected directly into a commercially-available sterile bottle
containing sodium thiosulphate powder for immediate neutraliza-
tion of residual chlorine.
Microbiological Testing
Microbiology testing was carried out at an on-site accredited
microbiology laboratory. The laboratory uses the Bactec 9000
blood culture system (Becton Dickinson, New Jersey), while other
specimens are inoculated onto a selection of appropriate agar
media. Screening specimens were plated onto McConkey agar
supplemented with 4 mg/ml of gentamicin. P. aeruginosa was
identified using Vitek 2 (BioMerieux, North Carolina) Gram
negative card, supplemented as necessary by phenotypic tests such
as oxidase positivity and production of green pigment. Antimi-
crobial susceptibilities were determined by the Vitek 2 (BioMer-
ieux, North Carolina), using the AST-N133 card and interpreted
according to Clinical Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI)
criteria [7].The following antibiotics were tested: piperacillin-
tazobactam, ceftazidime, cefepime, meropenem, imipenem, cip-
rofloxacin, gentamicin, amikacin and colistin. Water samples were
processed at the local accredited public health laboratory,
according to a standard protocol for detection of P. aeruginosa
based on membrane filtration, incubation of the membrane filter
in thioglycolate broth for 24 h, and subsequent subculture and
identification [8].
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis was performed and restriction
endonuclease digestion of the intact genomic DNA of all isolates
was performed in situ using SpeI [9]. Restriction fragments of DNA
were separated on a 1% wt/vol agarose gel using a CHEF-DRII
GeneNavigator apparatus (Amersham Biosciences, Fairfield, CT,
USA) at a pulse time of 5 to 30 s for 20 h at 200 V in 0.5% vol/vol
TBE buffer maintained at 14uC. Following staining with ethidium
bromide (0.5 mg/ml), the DNA fingerprints were visualized and
photographed under UV light. DNA fragment analysis was
performed using GelCompar II version 5.1 (Applied maths, St-
Martens-Latem, Belgium) and clusters were defined using the Dice
coefficient of similarity. Dendrograms were drawn with a position
tolerance of 1% and optimization of 1%. A cluster of isolates was
defined to include all isolates at greater than 80% similarity in
their DNA profiles according to the criteria of Tenover [10].
Multi-locus sequencing (MLST) of seven housekeeping genes
(acetyl coenzyme A synthetase acsA, shikimate dehydrogenase aroE
, GMP synthase guaA , DNA mismatch repair protein mutL,
NADH dehydrogenase I chain C, D nuoD, phosphoenolpyruvate
synthase ppsA and anthranilate synthetase component I trpE) was
performed on selected isolates spanning the outbreak period
according to a previously described method for P. aeruginosa [11].
The MLST database was used to determine allelic profiles for each
gene, and the subsequent sequence type, for each of the strains
(http://pubmlst.org/paeruginosa/).
Pseudomonas aeruginosa Bloodstream Infection
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 March 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 3 | e55985
Case-Control Study
A retrospective case-control study was conducted to identify
potential risk factors for P. aeruginosa bloodstream infection among
patients admitted to the unit. Cases identified between 1
December 2009 and 31 January 2011 were compared to patients
admitted to the unit over the same period of time who had
bloodstream infections due to Gram-negative bacteria other than
P. aeruginosa (GN Controls) and to patients who never developed
bloodstream infection due to Gram-negative bacteria (Non-GN
Controls).
Specific variables that were studied included age, sex, hospital
(public or private), length of hospitalization, primary diagnosis at
admission, antibiotic use, haemopoetic stem cell transplant
(HSCT) and chemotherapy. Antibiotic use was defined as
antibiotics used in the 30 days prior to isolation of P. aeruginosa
for cases and during any episode of admission in the ward for
controls. HSCT was defined as within one year prior to isolation of
P. aeruginosa for cases and within one year prior to final discharge
from the ward for controls. Chemotherapy was defined as any
chemotherapy given during the index admission prior to isolation
of P. aeruginosa for cases and chemotherapy during any episode of
admission in the ward for controls.
Statistical Analysis
Data management and statistical analysis was done using
STATA Intercooled version 11 (StataCorp. 2009. Stata Statistical
Software: Release 11. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP). Contin-
uous and discrete variables were summarized by median and
interquartile range and were compared between the cases and
controls using the Mann-Whitney U test. Categorical variables
were summarized by proportions (percentages) and Fischer’s exact
test was used to test for statistical significance. Odds ratios and
their 95% confidence intervals were calculated. Fischer’s exact test
was used to test for statistical significance. Backward elimination
stepwise logistic regression analysis (P-removal: 0.05) was used to
identify independent risk factors for P. aeruginosa infection.
Variables that were significantly associated with MRPA-BSI at
p,0.25 significance level were considered for possible inclusion in
the logistic regression model.
Results
Description of the outbreak
This outbreak of MRPA-BSI was detected in October 2010
after two patients who were admitted to the clinical haematology
ICU died very rapidly of MRPA-BSI over one weekend. Both
patients had been hospitalized for prolonged periods of time and
were neutropenic. The initial response to the outbreak was a
review of all practices in the ward, specifically maintenance of the
environmental infection control system and adherence to basic
infection control procedures. In November another three patients
developed P. aeruginosa bloodstream infection, two of whom died.
The ward was closed in the first week of December and thoroughly
cleaned. After reopening one further patient developed MRPA-
BSI and died in January 2011. Four additional cases of MRPA-
BSI that had occurred prior to detection of the outbreak were
identified through a retrospective search of the laboratory
database. There were no reported cases of MRPA infection or
colonisation in the unit prior to January 2010.
Eight of the cases were female (80%). All the cases were
neutropenic at the time of collection of the first blood culture with
MRPA. Seven (70%) of the cases had an admission diagnosis of
Acute Myeloid Leukemia (AML), one had Acute Lymphoblastic
Leukemia (ALL), one had Aplastic Anaemia and one with a B-cell
Lymphoma. Eight of the patients died (CFR = 80%), all within
48 hours of development of MRPA-BSI and despite the initiation
of colistin therapy in some patients (given usually at a dose of 3
million units 8 hourly) Most of the patients had prolonged periods
of hospitalization (median = 61 days) prior to development of
MRPA-BSI. Table 1 gives details of individual patients.Two
patients had evidence of MRPA colonisation at other sites, one
(case 9) on a skin swab taken from the site of insertion of a vascular
catheter four days prior to development of BSI, and one (case 10)
from a stool sample taken simultaneously with the detection of
BSI. Although weekly stool samples were taken for surveillance
purposes from all patients admitted to the haematology ICU, no
other patients were colonised with MRPA during the period of the
outbreak (December 2009 to January 2011).
One hundred and eighteen patients were admitted to the
haematology unit between 1 December 2009 and 31 January 2011
generating a total of 4399 patient-days. Of these patients 26
developed BSIs with Gram-negative bacilli other than P. aeruginosa.
Microbiology Results
In 9 cases the initial P. aeruginosa isolate was resistant to
ampicillin, cefuroxime, ceftriaxone, cefepime, ceftazidime, co-
amoxiclav, piperacillin-tazobactam, ertapenem, meropenem, im-
ipenem gentamicin, amikacin, cotrimoxazole, ciprofloxacin and
tigecycline. Two of these 9 isolates had reduced susceptibility to
colistin, with MICs of 4 and 8 mg/ml, respectively. The remaining
patient (case 2) had multiple isolates over time, with the initial 3
isolates being susceptible only to amikacin, ceftazidime and
colistin. Two subsequent isolates from this patient demonstrated
a progressive increase in resistance, with the first being susceptible
only to ceftazidime and colistin, and the final isolate being
susceptible to colistin only.
PFGE analysis shown in Figure 1 revealed that the 9 clinical
strains with similar antibiotic resistance profiles were closely
related, 8 with greater than 80% similarity, and 1 (Case 3) with
78.9% similarity, while one isolate, Case 2, was unrelated. MLST
analysis shown in Table 2 indicated that the isolates from cases 1,
4 and 10 belonged to Sequence Type (ST) 233 while that of Case 2
belonged to ST260 [12] (see Figures S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6 and S7
for MLST allele consensus sequences).
Environmental and Staff screening
Twenty six of 51 eligible staff members submitted stool
specimens. P. aeruginosa was not identified from any of the
submitted specimens. Three specimens contained other probable
nosocomially acquired organisms: two ESBL-producing Klebsiella
pneumoniae and one multi-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii.
A total of 49 environmental samples and 24 water samples were
tested. P. aeruginosa was identified in a single specimen taken from a
cleaning mop. The isolate was susceptible to ceftazidime and
colistin only, and its PFGE profile differed from the patient
isolates.
Case-Control Study
In bivariate analysis MRPA-BSI was associated with hospital-
isation longer than 60 days (OR = 60, 95% CI 4.73–2879), AML
(OR = 7.8, 95% CI 1.49–51.3) and prior use of amikacin
(OR = 0.22, 95% CI 0.04–1.08) and clarithromycin (OR = 12.6,
95% CI 1.16–164.8) when non-GN controls were used. When GN
controls were used clarithromycin (OR = 10.7, 95% CI 0.67–584),
metronidazole (OR = 16.7, 95% CI 1.2–852) and imipenem
(OR = 7.77, 95% CI 1.2–57.8) were significantly associated with
MRPA-BSI. (See Table 3)
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Variables independently associated with MRPA-BSI were AML
(OR = 19.5, 95% CI 2.03–187, p-value = 0.01) and prior use of
amikacin (OR = 0.06, 95% CI 0.006–0.581, p-value = 0.015) when
Non-GN controls were used. When GN controls were used,
metronidazole (OR = 16.7, 95% 1.56–177, p-value = 0.020) was
independently associated with MRPA. (See Table 4)
Discussion
We report an outbreak of MRPA-BSI infection occurring over a
one year period involving 10 immunocompromised patients in a
haematology unit of a tertiary hospital in Cape Town. In 9 out of
10 cases the organism was resistant to all antibiotics tested,
including carbapenems, and susceptible only to colistin. PFGE
analysis showed the 9 isolates to have identical profiles, and this
was confirmed with MLST which further indicated that 3 isolates
spanning the outbreak period belonged to ST233. Strains
belonging to ST233 have been described previously in a Japanese
outbreak in 2006–2009 [13] and in a case probably imported to
Scandinavia from Ghana [14].
The aim of the outbreak investigation was to identify the source
of the outbreak and associated risk factors in order to halt the
spread of MRPA in the ward Fortunately, transmission seems to
have been halted by the intervention conducted in December
2010 as the only case of MRPA-BSI after the ward was reopened
was a patient previously admitted to the ward before December
2010, who was presumed to have become colonised at that stage.
In general, bloodstream infection with P. aeruginosa among
patients with haematological conditions results chiefly from
endogenous sources [15]. The striking similarity among the strains
isolated from these cases suggests an exogenous common source.
Several potential sources for MRPA may exist in a hospital setting,
including colonized patients, staff or the environment.
Transmission of multi-resistant organisms from one patient to
another may occur by direct contact or indirectly, with formites or
healthcare workers as vectors [16–18]. In the current outbreak,
direct patient-to-patient transmission was considered unlikely as
patients were accommodated in separate isolation rooms and had
little or no contact with each other.
Transmission by staff could not be adequately investigated due
to the retrospective nature of the investigation. However,
screening of staff for long-term gut colonization with MRPA did
not reveal any carriers. It should, however, be noted that not all
Table 1. Characteristics of patients with Pseudomonas aeruginosa bloodstream infection in a haematology intensive care unit of a
tertiary academic hospital in Cape Town, South Africa, January 2010–January 2011.
Patients Hospital Age Sex Diagnosis
Length of hospitalisation
in unit (days) Date of infection Outcome
Case 1 public 46 M AML 11 03/01/2010 Died
Case 2 private 16 M Aplastic Anaemia 52 28/01/2010 Discharged
Case 3 public 28 F B-cell Lymphoma 70 31/05/2010 Died
Case 4 private 58 F AML 74 23/06/2010 Died
Case 5 private 20 F ALL 105 06/10/2010 Died
Case 6 public 37 F AML 19 08/10/2010 Died
Case 7 private 48 F AML 29 05/11/2010 Died
Case 8 private 46 F AML 49 21/11/2010 Died
Case 9 public 60 F AML 126 23/11/2010 Discharged
Case 10 public 20 F AML 125 13/01/2011 Died
AML Acute Myeloid Leukemia ALL Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055985.t001
Figure 1. Dendrogram of clinical and environmental Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolates from outbreak among patients admitted to
the haematology intensive care unit of a tertiary academic hospital in Cape Town, South Africa, January 2010–January 2011.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055985.g001
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Table 2. Multi-locus sequence typing (MLST) allelic profiles and sequences for five selected Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolates as
determined from the MLST database (http://pubmlst.org/paeruginosa/).
MLST alleles
Patients acsA aroE guaA mutL nuoD ppsA trpE ST
Case 1 16 5 13 11 4 31 41 233
Case 2 14 5 10 7 4 13 7 260
Case 4 16 5 13 11 4 31 41 233
Case 10 16 5 13 11 4 31 41 233
ST Sequence Type
acsA Acetyl coenzyme A synthetase
aroE Shikimate dehydrogenase
guaA GMP synthase
mutL DNA mismatch repair protein
nuoD NADH dehydrogenase I chain C, D
ppsA Phosphoenolpyruvate synthase
trpE Anthranilate synthetase component I
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055985.t002
Table 3. Bivariate analysis of risk factors associated with multi-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa bloodstream infection among
patients admitted to the haematology intensive care unit of a tertiary academic hospital in Cape Town, South Africa, January 2010–
January 2011.
Risk Factor Cases Non-GN Controls GN Controls
(n = 10) (n = 61) OR (95% CI) p-Value n = 26 OR (95% CI) p-Value
Female, n (%) 8 (80%) 32 (52.5%) 3.62(0.64–37.11) 0.1036 17 (65.4%) 2.12 (0.311–24.16) 0.3938
Hospitalisation
Public Hospital, n (%) 5 (50%) 32 (52.5%) 0.91 (0.19–4.38) 0.8853 12 (46.1%) 1.17 (0.21–6.45) 0.836
Cumulative length of
hospitalisation longer than 2
months (60 days)
5 (50%) 1 (18%) 60 (4.73–2879.6) ,0.0001 8 (30.8%) 2.25 (0.386–12.8) 0.2819
Diagnosis
AML, n (%) 7 (70%) 14 (22.9%) 7.8 (1.49–51.3) 0.0025 13 (50%) 2.33 (0.404–16.7) 0.2794
ALL 1 (10%) 7 (11.5%) 0.86 (0.017–8.17) 0.8912 3 (11.5%) 0.85 (0.015–12.4) 0.8953
Aplastic anaemia 1 (10%) 3 (4.92%) 2.15 (0.037–29.98) 0.5183 1 (3.85%) 2.78 (0.032–226.5) 0.4703
Therapeutic Procedure
Bone Marrow Transplant, n (%) 4 (44.4%) 34 (58.6%) 0.56 (0.102–2.95) 0.4245 9 (37.5%) 1.33 (0.205–8.12) 0.7161
Chemotherapy, n (%) 7 (78%) 32 (55.2) 2.84 (0.48–29.9) 0.2008 18 (75%) 1.17 (0.152–14.46) 0.8683
Antibiotic use
Amikacin, n (%) 4 (40%) 46 (75.4%) 0.22 (0.04–1.08) 0.023 16 (61.5%) 0.42 (0.07–2.33) 0.244
Cotrimoxazole, n (%) 1 (10%) 17 (27.9%) 0.29 (0.006–2.4) 0.2286 0 - -
Clarithromycin, n (%) 3 (30%) 2 (3.28%) 12.6 (1.16–164.8) 0.0022 1 (3.85%) 10.7 (0.67–584.1) 0.0253
Metronidazole, n (%) 4 (40%) 16 (26.2%) 1.87 (0.34–9.06) 0.3696 1 (3.85%) 16.7 (1.2–852.1) 0.005
Gentamicin, n (%) 2 (20%) 5 (8.19%) 2.8 (0.226–20.8) 0.2458 5 (19.2%) 1.05 (0.084–8.22) 0.9583
Imipenem, n (%) 7 (70%) 38 (62.3%) 1.41 (0.285–9.26) 0.6392 6 (23.1%) 7.77 (1.2–57.8) 0.0087
Ofloxacin, n (%) 7 (70%) 44 (72.1%) 0.901 (0.179–6.03) 0.8896 20 (76.9%) 0.7 (0.109–5.55) 0.6674
Piperacillin/Tazobactam, n (%) 3 (30%) 34 (55.7%) 0.34 (0.053–1.69) 0.131 6 (23.1%) 1.43 (0.18–9.14) 0.6674
Vancomycin, n (%) 6 (60%) 36 (59%) 1.04 (0.22–5.55) 0.9532 11 (42.3%) 2.04 (0.369–12.2) 0.3409
Non-GN Controls: controls who never developed bloodstream infection due to Gram-negative bacteria.
GN Controls: controls who had bloodstream infections due to Gram-negative bacteria other than P. aeruginosa.
AML Acute myeloid leukaemia ALL Acute lymphoblastic leukaemia.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055985.t003
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staff participated in the screening initiative. Additionally, the ward
has a high turnover of temporary agency nursing staff who could
not be accounted for.
Although none of the patients admitted to the haematology ICU
between December 2009 and January 2011 showed evidence of
gastro-intestinal colonization with MRPA, adherence to the
schedule of weekly stool surveillance samples, as specified by the
unit protocol, had been inconsistent during this time.
No environmental source of infection was identified. P. aeruginosa
was isolated from only one of 73 environmental specimens
collected. This isolate differed from the outbreak strain in both
antibiotic resistance and PFGE profiles. Given the time delay
between the occurrence of the first cases in January 2010 and the
collection of the environmental samples in October of that year, it
is possible that an initial environmental source had existed, but
had already been eliminated by the time of the screening. One of
the drawbacks of the study was that we were unable to narrow our
investigations to the particular isolation rooms occupied by
patients with MRPA- BSI, since the unit did not keep records of
individual room occupancy.
A case-control study was conducted to identify potential risk
factors for P. aeruginosa bloodstream infection among patients
admitted to the unit. Cases with P. aeruginosa BSI were compared
to patients with bloodstream infections due to other Gram-negative
bacteria and to patients without Gram-negative bloodstream
infection. Potential risk factors identified on multivariate analysis
included for the comparison to patients with other Gram negative
BSIs, the prior use of metronidazole (OR = 16.7, 95% 1.56–177, p-
value = 0.020), and for the comparison to patients without other
Gram-negative BSIs, an underlying diagnosis of AML (OR = 19.5,
95% CI 2.03–187, p-value = 0.01). The prior use of amikacin
(OR = 0.06, 95% CI 0.006–0.581, p-value = 0.015) appeared to be
protective in this latter group (See Table 4).
The findings from the case-control study should be interpreted
with caution, given the small number of cases, as well as the fact
that data for important variables, such as the severity and duration
of neutropenia, were not available. The period of observation for
controls was generally much longer than the period of observation
for cases and thus observational bias may have led to underes-
timation of certain exposures among the cases. In addition, control
group selection in studies of antimicrobial resistant nosocomial
pathogens is complicated and use of inappropriate controls may
give misleading results [19].
The haematology ward is specifically designed for maximal
protection of vulnerable patients; strict infection control protocols
are in place and access to the ward is strictly controlled. While it is
not unusual for multi-resistant pathogens such as MRPA to be
sporadically introduced into such units, the infection control
procedures in place should contain the infection. Irrespective of
the original source of the MRPA outbreak strain and whether it
was subsequently transmitted from human or environmental
locations, breaches in infection control may have contributed to
the sustained spread of this organism over time.
This outbreak occurred in a shared public–private unit where
two separate staff groups share a common environment. There
was no evidence to suggest that patients from either the public or
private side were more likely to become infected. However, being
a shared unit did contribute to the complexity of managing the
outbreak in that communication with both sectors was constantly
required. The case fatality rate during this outbreak was high in
comparison to other studies conducted in similar populations [20–
22]. This was, in part, due to severe underlying immunocompro-
mise among the patients, but to a larger extent due to extensive
resistance of the MRPA strain. Early initiation of empirical
therapy with broad-spectrum antibiotics is associated with reduced
mortality among patients with neutropenic sepsis [23–25]. The
MRPA strain encountered in this outbreak was resistant to most
antibiotics with antipseudomonal activity and infection progressed
so rapidly that even early initiation of colistin therapy in the later
cases, did not improve the patient outcomes. Further character-
isation of the mechanisms contributing to the multi-resistant
phenotype of these strains is ongoing.
Given such a resistant organism and a population in whom
infection is so severe and progresses so rapidly, emphasis must be
put on preventing acquisition and transmission of infection in the
first place. Future efforts on dealing with resistant organisms among
this patient population must focus on early identification and
decolonization/decontamination of potential sources, possibly using
routine screening of patients, staff and the environment as a tool.
Although the haematology unit had a policy of regular
screening of patients for gut colonization with resistant pathogens,
this had not been implemented consistently in the weeks and
months preceding the outbreak. This, coupled with the fact that
the outbreak was detected 9 months after the first occurrence,
indicates the importance of continuous, consistent surveillance of
nosocomial infections among high-risk patients. Surveillance for
pathogens in such settings should also incorporate molecular
methods to support epidemiological data.
In conclusion, we have described an outbreak of MRPA due to
a single strain, but were unable to identify the source of the
organism. The outbreak appears to have been contained by the
temporary closure and cleaning of the ward in December 2010.
Poor adherence to infection control may have facilitated
transmission of MRPA. It is vital that in future increased resources
and effort is available for the strengthening of infection control
practices in the hospital concerned.
Outbreaks of nosocomial infections due to drug resistant
organisms are an important infection control problem in both
developed and limited-resource countries. They contribute to the
overall burden of disease and are often associated with high costs
and increased mortality. Despite widespread recognition of drug
resistant pathogens as a universal problem, few outbreaks of this
nature are investigated and reported in low-resourced countries
[26–28]. Outbreaks due to drug resistant pathogens may be more
likely to occur in middle income countries, where resources allow for
the use of broad spectrum antibiotics, but not for adequate infection
control and surveillance. As far as we know this is the second
published report of a nosocomial outbreak of P. aeruginosa from
South Africa, the first having been published in 2002 [29]. Our
Table 4. Multivariate analysis of risk factors associated with
multi-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa bloodstream
infections among patients admitted to the haematology
intensive care unit of a tertiary academic hospital, in Cape
Town, South Africa, January 2010–January 2011.
Control Group Risk Factor Adjusted OR (95% CI) p-Value
Non-GN Controls AML 19.5 (2.03–187) 0.010
Amikacin 0.06 (0.006–0.581) 0.015
GN Controls Metronidazole 16.7 (1.56–177) 0.020
AML Acute myeloid leukaemia.
Non-GN Controls patients who never developed bloodstream infection due to
Gram-negative bacteria.
GN Controls patients with bloodstream infections due to Gram-negative
bacteria other than P. aeruginosa.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055985.t004
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report highlights the problem of antimicrobial-resistant organisms
and the infection control challenges that they pose in a limited
resource setting. It also highlights the need to create capacity for
surveillance and investigation of nosocomial outbreaks.
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